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COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE :E°EDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM. By J. 
Woodford Howard, Jr. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
1981. Pp. xxvi, 415. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $12.50. 
Circuit courts of appeals occupy a relatively obscure position in 
the federal judicial hierarchy. Lacking the immediacy of the ninety-
five district courts and the visible omnipotence of the Supreme 
Court, circuit courts, until recently, have received only cursory atten-
tion in the legal literature. Over the past decade, however, analysts 
have begun to acknowledge the significance of these intermediate 
appellate tribunals; moreover, some of the more enlightened com-
mentaries have presented the circuits as integral components of the 
federal legal system.1 
J. Woodford Howard, Jr.'s timely study, Courts of Appeals in the 
' 9. In the chapter on judicial restraints, Neely only mentions that courts are asked to solve 
problems today that would not have been brought to courts twenty years ago. P. 202. This 
indirect reference is used to illustrate the increase in the judicial workload; Neely does not 
consider how this increase in workload undercuts his proposed restraints. 
10. In his analysis of the judicial balancing function, Neely implicitly assumes that courts 
can decide when to intervene. Horowitz, in an empirical study, concluded that courts are par-
ticularly unfit to make this threshold intervention decision. Horowitz found courts poorly 
suited to judge the consequences of policy-making, hence poorly suited to decide when to 
intervene. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 257-97 (1977). 
Neely also overlooks the views of others in his analysis of restraints on the judiciary. Pro-
fessor Choper notes that the basic restraints on the Supreme Court are impeachment and con-
stitutional amendment. Neither of these restraints looms large as a practical matter. Because 
of this lack of external restraints, the Supreme Court at times has held to positions that are 
highly unpopular. J. CHOPER, supra note I, at 47-55. 
Others have disagreed with Choper and Horowitz. See Chayes, supra note I, at 1307-09; 
McGowan, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 616 (1981). Neely, however, does not attempt to 
refute their arguments. 
I. See, e.g., s. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 
{2d ed. 1976); R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS (1970); G. 
SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (rev. ed. 1974). 
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Federal Judicial System, supplements the existing literature with an 
exhaustive investigation of the effects of the recent litigation explo-
sion2 on three leading circuits.3 Interestingly, Howard is concerned 
· not only with ''the business and functions of the three major tribu-
nals in the flow of federal litigation," but also with "the attitudes of 
the judges toward their job and its chief problems" (p. xvii). These 
concerns led him to augment the detailed information that he and 
his assistants compiled on thousands of cases over a three-year pe-
riod with insights gleaned from interviews with a number of circuit 
judges. Although these interviews lend a personal touch, and at 
times even produce a chuckle, Howard, like his predecessors, resorts 
to rigorous systems analysis. Consequently, readers who feel at ease 
with the technical jargon commonly used by political scientists will 
find Courts of Appeals relevant and enlightening. Readers who lack 
a strong background in the social sciences, however, must master the 
book's appendices before undertaking the yeoman task of deci-
phering Howard's incessant stream of data.4 
In an attempt to impose a sense of order on his voluminous re-
search, Howard initially poses two questions: (1) What binds federal 
courts into a judicial system? and (2) What controls the personal dis-
cretion of circuit judges as they make law and policy in the course of 
adjudication? Howard uses the answers to these inquiries to test var-
ious proposals for alleviating the pressures imposed by an expanding 
caseload. 
Courts of Appeals consists of three parts. In Part I, Howard as-
sesses the formal constraints5 on judicial decision-making. In the-
ory, the possibility of reversal by the Supreme Court should 
significantly restrict the exercise of discretion by circuit judges. But 
the Court's capacity to review lower court decisions is quite limited.6 
Since the Justices can review only a few cases, Howard finds, circuit 
courts usually dictate the final outcome. This freedom of the circuit 
judges to make policy, in Howard's view, promotes autonomy and 
2. Between 1961 and 1978, the number of cases brought in the circuit courts roughly qua-
drupled. P. 10. 
3. Because of time and financial constraints, Professor Howard limited his study to the 
Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits. He chose these tribunals on the basis of 
significance, convenience, and variety. P. xix. 
4. Howard prefaces the book with a warning: "Because the analysis draws upon social 
concepts that may be unfamiliar to some readers, the basic conceptions and limitations of the 
research design should be understood from the start. (Further details regarding methodology 
appear in Appendix 1.)" Pp. xviii-xiv. 
5. Throughout the book, Howard distinguishes between formal and informal constraints. 
Formal constraints include those procedural mechanisms built into the federal judicial system 
(i.e., Supreme Court review, rehearings en bane, and panel rotation). Informal constraints 
embrace the relatively subtle notions of shared judicial norms, a common sense of purpose, 
and complementary political and professional values. 
6. From 1965 to 1967, the Supreme Court heard only 1.9% of all circuit court cases; fur-
thermore, the Justices reversed only two thirds of the decisions that they heard. Pp. 57-58. 
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heterogeneity. He concludes, therefore, that the specter of Supreme 
Court review does not, by itself, bind the intermediate federal courts 
into a judicial system (p. 84). 
Although the statistics on Supreme Court review appear to sup-
port Howard's appraisal, he probably underestimates the overall ef-
fectiveness of formal constraints. Actual review by the Supreme 
Court is only one of the formal constraints on the discretion of cir-
cuit court judges. Howard asserts only that the Court cannot directly 
oversee the circuit courts; he fails to give due consideration to other, 
less hierarchical controls. The doctrine of stare decisis, for example, 
lends stability to the process of adjudication. Circuit judges do, of 
course, have some leeway to make policy, but they must work within 
the boundaries established by judicial precedent. 
The answers to Howard's initial inquiries unfold in Part II as he 
shifts his attention to the circuit judges themselves and to the infor-
mal constraints that help form their consensus. Howard cites three 
processes that tend to filter judges of like character into appellate 
tribunals (pp. 89-120). First, the recruitment procedure weeds out 
incompetents and political extremists and draws upon accomplished 
jurists of middle-class means and moderate political convictions. 
Next, the socialization of circuit court judges - training that occurs 
primarily before their promotion to the bench - prompts a further 
convergence of ideological values. Finally, the process of profes-
sionalization gives rise to common judicial norms. Through long 
years of legal training - education, private practice, teaching, and 
adjudication - circuit judges acquire similar professional values. 
Ultimately, Howard :finds, they share a sense of purpose. 7 
These three filtering processes, Howard maintains, promote con-
sensus in judicial decision-making. 8 A shared conception of duty, 
spawned by complementary political and professional values, sus-
tains both unity and uniformity. Informal, rather than formal con-
straints, therefore, provide the glue that binds the diverse elements of 
the federal court system. Succinctly summarized, Howard's :final po-
sition is that " 'men count more than machinery' " (p. 124). 
Howard makes his principal contribution to the legal literature in 
Part III. Perhaps the most pressing problem facing the courts of ap-
peals today is their ever-increasing caseloads. In Part III, Howard 
discusses a number of proposals for mitigating the damage caused by 
this phenomenon (pp. 269-89). These include increasing the number 
of judges and circuits, realigning the existing judicial districts to bal-
ance limited resources, streamlining management to promote effi-
7. According to Howard, ''.judges were united by a common understanding that the central 
mission of circuit courts is to adjudicate appeals as agents of the national government." P. 156. 
8. But see p. 204 (referring to the "bitter'' and "acerbic" conflicts between various circuit 
court judges). 
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cient adjudication, and diverting certain types of cases to less 
congested and better-suited tribunals. 
Howard criticizes each proposal in tum. Because of the system's 
sensitive nature, he warns, ill-considered solutions will cause wide-
spread harm and may upset the consensual basis for decisions. Ad-
ding more judges, for example, could make en bane proceedings 
unmanageable; alternatively, increasing the number of circuits might 
aggravate regionalism and intercircuit conflicts. Geographic realign-
ment raises similar provincial difficulties and, in any event, offers 
only limited potential for improvement. Better management would 
increase efficiency but it would exact a high price in terms of judicial 
flexibility and personalized attention. Finally, Howard faults diver-
sion because it would restrict access to the federal courts. 
Once again, Howard's criticisms are partly unwarranted. If, as 
he suggests, men count more than machinery, then the system's sur-
vival primarily depends on the informal norms that influence judi-
cial decision-making. As long as the existing means of recruitment, 
socialization, and professionalization are preserved, the federal cir-
cuit courts can accommodate the structural alterations that these re-
forms would entail. The system, in fact, has already demonstrated 
its resilience by enduring the addition of new judgeships9 and the 
partition of the Fifth Circuit. Despite Howard's premonitions, it 
should survive similar changes in the future. 
On the whole, however, Courts of Appeals deserves more praise 
than criticism. Howard does not pretend to offer a panacea for the 
chronic afflictions of the federal circuit courts. He merely seeks to 
discuss the ramifications of potential changes before the litigation 
explosion compels hasty action. From this perspective, the best 
measure of the book's success may well be the fruitfulness of the 
further debate that it is almost certain to trigger. 10 
9. In 1978, Congress increased the number of circuit judgeships from 97 to 132. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 44(a) (Supp. II 1978). 
10. Howard's book has also been reviewed by Sbarboro, Book Review, 67 A.B.A. J. 1168 
(1981); Whiteman, Book Review, 106 LIB. J. 466 (1981). 
